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List of Parties to this Appeal
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Aria Marshall (fka Card). They were formerly married and divorced in 2014.
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Jurisdictional Statement

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals in domestic
relations proceedings per Utah Code 78A-4-103(2)(h).
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Statement of the Issues
Issue: To extend a domestic relations Protective Order after two years have

passed the court must find the petitioner harbors a "reasonable fear of future

G

abuse." The statute defines "abuse" as intentionally attempting to cause a
cohabitant physical harm or placing her in reasonable fear of imminent physical
harm. The court below extended the Protective Order because it felt the
respondent, Mr. Card, engaged in emotionally distressing conduct by sending
his court-ordered child support directly to Ms. Marshall, his former wife, or her
bank and because of a parent-time dispute in November 2012. The Court
reasoned this gave her a "reasonable fear of future abuse" even though he never
threatened her physical safety while the Order was in effect.
Did the court err in its legal conclusion that those grievances would cause
a reasonable person to fear future "abuse" - meaning "physical harm" - absent an
extension of the Protective Order?
Standard of Review: Whether a particular course of conduct would give

someone an objectively "reasonable" fear of "future abuse" is a mixed question

G

of law and fact. That is, a determination whether "a given set of facts comes
within the reach of a given rule of law." Cf. In re Baby B., 2012 UT 35, <J[ 46, 308

Q

8

Q

P.3d 382 (Defining mixed question of fact and law). To answer that question, this
Court must first determine whether the court below relied upon the correct
statutory definition of "abuse" in its analysis. Bott v. Osburn, 2011 UT App 139, <fl
5, 257 P.3d 1022 (the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law).
Second, whether its findings of fact satisfy the legal standard for concluding a
"reasonable fear of future abuse" exists. Cf. Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT
38, <jl<jl 33 and 40, 308 P.3d 461 (the question of "reasonableness" and "whether a
set of facts falls within a legal standard" is an objective question of law).
While an appellate court generally defers to a district court's findings
regarding empirical factual matters (assuming there is any evidence to support
them), it gives no deference to the legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Baby
B. 2012 UT 35 at <jl<jl 40-47. That is because the public is entitled to rely on
consistent rules established by set appellate precedent. Id. <JI 44. "Because
appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to
say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction,
we must be vigilant in our review of both purely factual and mixed findings to
ensure that they are based on correct legal principles." Id. <JI 47.
For example, "if a hypothetical statute were to impose penalties for the
9

wearing of a red shirt, a trial court could be called upon to make a factual finding
on the empirical question of the color of an individual party's shirt. But such a
finding could also entail an embedded legal conclusion, such as whether fuchsia
shirts are prohibited. Our review of a court's decision under this statute would
defer to the factual finding on the empirical question of the color of a particular
shirt. But we would give no deference on the legal question of the meaning of the
statutory term 'red,' deciding for ourselves whether fuchsia shirts are covered.
Thus, if a trial court finds that a particular fuchsia shirt is effectively a red one
covered by the statute, the applicable standard of review would require us to
distinguish the factual finding on the empirical question of the shirt's color from
the legal conclusion on what is meant by the term 'red."' Id. 'iI 47.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R:281-294, 307-313, 532-538, 540-544.

Issue No. 2: When hearing an appeal of a commissioner's recommendation

in a protective order case, the district court must make "independent" findings of
fact and conclusions of law "based on the evidence ... presented to the judge."
See Utah R. of Civ. P. 108(d)(2) and (f). Instead, the court below relied upon
several "findings" made by the commissioner to support its ruling even though
10
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no evidence was presented at trial to support of those findings.
Did the district court err by incorporating those unsupported findings into
its analysis?
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation of a court rule is a question
of law this court reviews de nova. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ':I[ 15, 16 P.3d 540.
While findings of fact are normally entitled to deference if there is any admissible
evidence to support them, a finding not supported by admissible evidence will
be disregarded. Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 723-25 (Utah App. 1994).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R:282, 294,308,338, 368-369.

Issue No. 3: Although the court below made a "finding" that Mr. Card
violated the Protective Order while it was in effect, it did not describe how he
violated it nor find that he knowingly did so.
Overall, are the trial court's conclusory findings of fact inadequate to
justify the conclusion that Mr. Card knowingly violated the Protective Order
thereby giving Ms. Marshall an objectively reasonable fear of "abuse"?
Standard of Review: While findings of fact are generally entitled to
deference, those findings must be sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful
11

appellate review. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923-924 (Utah App. 1992); Towner
v. Ridgway, 2008 UT 23, 'f[<Il 13-16, 182 P.3d 347 (Explaining a conclusory finding
of "stalking" is insufficient to justify a restraining order without subsidiary
findings satisfying each element of the legal definition of stalking). Inadequately
detailed findings are grounds for a remand and reconsideration unless the facts
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1983).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R:337-347, 367-370.

Issue No. 4: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Card to

pay Ms. Marshall's attorney fees?
Standard of Review: A court's decision to award attorney fees in a

domestic relations proceeding is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dahl v.
Dahl, 2015 UT 79,

<J[

168. A discretionary decision premised on an error of law

constitutes an abuse of discretion. Granger v. Granger, 2016 UT App 67,

<Jr

10.

Preservation: This issue is preserved. R:281-294, 307-313, 532-538, 540-544.
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Determinative Provisions

Utah Code 78B-7-115 (Dismissal of protective order) states in relevant part:
(1) A protective order that has been in effect for at least two years may be
dismissed if the court determines that the petitioner no longer has a
reasonable fear of future abuse. In determining whether the petitioner no
longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the respondent has complied with treatment
recommendations related to domestic violence, entered at the time
the protective order was entered;
(b) whether the protective order was violated during the time it was
in force;
(c) claims of harassment, abuse, or violence by either party during
the time the protective order was in force;
(d) counseling or therapy undertaken by either party;
(e) impact on the well-being of any minor children of the parties, if
relevant; and
(f) any other factors the court considers relevant to the case before it.
(3) The court shall enter sanctions against either party if the court
determines that either party acted:
(a) in bad faith; or
(b) with intent to harass or intimidate either party.

Utah Code 78B-7-102 (Definitions) states in relevant part:
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to
cause a cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a
cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section
77-36-1.
13

(10) "Protective order" means an order issued pursuant to this chapter
subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner and
respondent have been given notice in accordance with this chapter.
Utah Code 77-36-1 (Definitions) states in relevant part:
(4) "Domestic violence" or "domestic violence offense" means any criminal
offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of violence or
physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a
criminal offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by
one cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence" or "domestic violence
offense" also means commission or attempt to commit, any of the
following offenses by one cohabitant against another:
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103;
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102;
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201;
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106;
(e) electronic communication harassment, as described in Section 769-201;
(f) kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping, as
described in Sections 76-5-301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302;
(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105;
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual
Offenses, and Section 76-5b-201, Sexual Exploitation of a Minor;
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5;
(j) unlawful detention or unlawful detention of a minor, as described
in Section 76-5-304;
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as
described in Section 76-5-108;
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part
1, Property Destruction, Part 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass, or
Part 3, Robbery;
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as
described in Section 76-10-507;

14
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(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the
direction of any person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section
76-10-508;
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction
of disorderly conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the
defendant was originally charged with a domestic
violence offense otherwise described in this Subsection (4).
Conviction of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in
the manner described in this Subsection (4)(o), does not constitute a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. Section
921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms Act,
18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq.; or
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1.
Utah Code 76-5-106 (Harassment) states:
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass
another, he communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any
violent felony.
Utah Code 76-5-106.5 (Stalking) states:
(1) As used in this section:
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a
specific person, including:
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs,
surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or
interferes with a person's property:
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes
someone else to engage in any of these acts:
(A) approaches or confronts a person;
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's
employer or coworkers;
15

(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's
neighbors, or enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a
person;
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the
purpose of obtaining or disseminating information about or
communicating with the person to a member of the person's
family or household, employer, coworker, friend, or associate
of the person;
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property
owned, leased, or occupied by a person, or to the person's
place of employment with the intent that the object be
delivered to the person; or
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other
electronic means to commit an act that is a part of the course
of conduct.

(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological
suffering, whether or not medical or other professional treatment or
counseling is required.
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's
circumstances.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages

in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should
know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person:
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person;
or
(b) to suffer other emotional distress.

Utah Code 78B-7-106 (Protective orders) states:
(6) The protective order shall include:
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, when the civil
16

portion of the protective order either expires or is scheduled for review by
the court, which date may not exceed 150 days after the date the order is
issued, unless the court indicates on the record the reason for setting a date
beyond 150 days.

Statement of the Case

This appeal stems from a district court's order declining to vacate a
domestic relations Protective Order in effect for over four years now under Utah
Code 78B-7-115(1)(Explaining a domestic relations protective order is subject to
dismissal after two years if the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of
future abuse). The final judgment from which this appeal is taken was entered on
November 13, 2015, an objection as to form challenging the sufficiency of the trial
court's findings was filed on September 15, 2015, and the Notice of Appeal was
filed on December 1, 2015.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History
On April 2, 2012, Petitioner Aria Marshall requested a Protective Order

against her then-husband, Respondent Devin Card, based on accusations of
shoving and nonconsensual sexual intercourse during their marriage. [R:1-10,
17

545]. Mr. Card denied those accusations in a written response. [R:17-33].
Following a contested hearing before a Commissioner based solely on proffers,
the Commissioner issued a protective order against Mr. Card believing that he
had shoved Ms. Marshall during an argument. [R:414-435].
Among other things, that Protective Order awarded Ms. Marshall full
custody of the parties' child and prohibited Mr. Card from abusing, engaging in
domestic violence, stalking, harassing, or using any kind of physical force against
Ms. Marshall. [R:38-44]. While ordered to stay away from her home in Lehi,
[R:40], the "Civil Portion" of the Order permitted him to go there for the limited
purpose of conducting custody exchanges arranged through Ms. Marshall's
father, Steve Bunker. [R:42]. The Order stated this "Civil Portion" would
"expire" or "be reviewed by the court" after an unspecified number of days,
[R:41], which Utah Code 78B-7-106(6)(a) states is "150 days" by default. The
Order concluded by stating that after two years had passed Mr. Card could
request a hearing to dismiss it. [R:44].
Acting pro se, Mr. Card filed an objection to the Commissioner's decision
and requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the factual basis for that
protective order. [R: 49-63, 66-78]. Initially the trial court granted his request and
18

vacated the Protective Order. [R: 94-96, 436-444]. However, Ms. Marshall then
moved to reinstate the Protective Order because Mr. Card had not filed his
objection within 10 days of the hearing before the Commissioner. [R: 97-105, 462479]. The trial court reinstated the Protective Order based on that technicality.
[R:120, 476-478]. Mr. Card filed various prose motions seeking reconsideration of
that decision but the judge denied all of them on procedural grounds. [R:137-181,
194-216, 222-229]. At one point Mr. Card filed an appeal from those rulings but
later voluntarily dismissed it. [R:182-193].
On April 10, 2015, Mr. Card retained counsel and filed a verified motion to
vacate the Protective Order which by then had been in effect for almost three
years. [R:230-237]. He attested that he had not engaged in any acts of abuse
against Ms. Marshall since the order had been entered, had completed domestic
violence counseling, and there was no need to keep it in place. [R: 233-237]. Ms.
Marshall opposed his request, arguing she harbored a reasonable fear of future
abuse and wanted to continue the Protective Order. [R:245-248]. Mr. Card
disputed her claim. [R:263-268].
An initial hearing was held before a Commissioner on May 20, 2015.
[R:271-272]. After hearing competing proffers of testimony, the Commissioner
19

took the case under advisement and later issued a minute entry recommending
the Protective Order remain in effect. [R: 273-279]. Mr. Card timely objected to
that recommendation and requested an evidentiary hearing before the assigned

Q

Judge under Utah R. of Civ. P. 108. [R:281-294]. The Judge granted his request.
Q

[R:305].
On August 17, 2015, Mr. Card filed a motion in limine to prohibit Ms.
Marshall from introducing, among other things, any evidence she had not
previously presented to the Commissioner and exclude any allegation about Mr.
Card filing a separate tort action against her, a dispute over a parent-time
exchange in 2012, an alleged bar complaint against Ms. Marshall's counsel, and
about disparaging remarks he had allegedly made to Ms. Marshall's counsel
about another commissioner. [R:307-313]. Ms. Marshall did not file any
opposition brief. [R:320].
On September 1, 2015, the trial court convened an evidentiary hearing on
Mr. Card's request to dismiss the protective order. [R:480]. The Court began by
summarily denying Mr. Card's motion in limine and promptly took a recess
without allowing Mr. Card to be heard concerning it. [R:482-483].
Ms. Marshall testified that for the past three years Mr. Card had not had
20
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any direct contact with her and had not threatened her with any kind of physical
harm. [R:487-501]. They only communicated through her parents about issues
involving their child. [R:488].
She acknowledged accusing Mr. Card of violating the Protective Order
back in April 2012 by authoring a message accusing her of infidelity. However,
she conceded that message was addressed to her parents; not her. [R:488-489].
She likewise admitted Mr. Card did not ask her parents to relay that message to
her and did not say anything threatening. [R:489]. The criminal charge against
Mr. Card stemming from that incident was subsequently dismissed. [R:492-493].
Ms. Marshall also accused Mr. Card of telephone harassment in 2013 but
acknowledged that dispute was between him and a third-party. [R:498, 500-501].
He never tried to contact her. In fact, he had not spoken with her since the
Protective Order was issued in April 2012. [Id.]. She likewise acknowledged he
did not say anything threatening during that call. [Id.].
There was a parent-time dispute on November 25, 2012, due to Mr. Card's
reluctance to meet Ms. Marshall at her residence in Lehi to exchange their child.
[R:489-491, 504, 545]. The "Civil Portion" of the Protective Order permitting Mr.
Card to go to Ms. Marshall's residence for exchanges had expired. [R:514-516,
21

525, 40-42]; Utah Code 78B-7-106(6)(a)(Explaining the civil portion of a protective
order automatically expires after 150 days unless the court specifically orders
otherwise). 1 Based on Ms. Marshall's past behavior, he was concerned she would
accuse him of violating the Order if he showed up there anyways. [Id.] Mr. Card
reached out to Ms. Marshall's father, Steve Bunker, to negotiate an alternate
location for the exchange that did not violate the Order and proposed a
McDonalds restaurant in Lehi. [R:515-518]. During this conversation Mr. Card
made the statement that he was uncomfortable relinquishing his child to anyone
unless Ms. Marshall was in the car. [R:525]. However, he expressly stated he did

G

not want to have any contact with Ms. Marshall; he just wanted to know their
child was going back to her. [R:526].
Regrettably, the parties were unable to come to a resolution on their own
and the local police were summoned to resolve the matter. Everyone eventually
agreed to meet at the McDonalds in Lehi for the exchange. [R:517]. Again, it was
undisputed there was no direct or even attempted contact between the parties
during this exchange. [R:493]. Ms. Marshall further conceded that because the

1
Because the Protective Order was issued on April 16, 2012, the Civil
Portion of that order would have expired 150 days later on September 13, 2012.
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police were present she had no reason to fear being harmed by Mr. Card. [R:494].
Although Ms. Marshall sought custodial interference charges against Mr. Card,
that charge was ultimately dismissed. [R:518, 492-493, 529).
On March 18, 2014, the parties finalized their divorce in a separate
proceeding. [R:486]. Ms. Marshall was awarded custody of their child and Mr.
Card was awarded parent-time and ordered to pay her child support. [R:499]. In
light of the parties' prior disputes over the logistics of parent-time exchanges, the
Court directed that all parent-time exchanges take place at ACAFS. 2 [R:498-499].
Once ACAFS began facilitating parent-time exchanges there were no further
problems between the parties in that regard. (R:247, 499].
Notwithstanding all this, Ms. Marshall reported she still felt threatened
because Mr. Card had been mailing his monthly court-ordered child support
checks to her which meant he knew where she lived. [R:499, 501-507]. 3 After she
began refusing to cash his court-ordered child support checks, he became

2
ACAFS (the Academy for Child Advocacy and Family Support) is a facility
commonly used for overseeing parent-time exchanges in Utah County. See
www.utahfamilyacademy.org (Last accessed April 27, 2016).
3
There was no testimony that there was any order entered in the divorce or
protective order cases that prohibited Mr. Card from knowing where his child
and Ms. Marshall lived.
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concerned she planned to falsely accuse him of contempt and arranged to have a
process server deliver his support checks to her. [R:523-525]. Neither Ms.
Marshall nor her counsel refuted Mr. Card's testimony that he reached out to her
attorney asking how she wanted him to deliver his court-ordered child support
to her but received no answer. [R:530-531].
In closing argument, Mr. Card argued Ms. Marshall had not demonstrated
an objectively reasonable fear of "abuse" which the statute defined narrowly as
intentionally attempting to cause physical harm or place a cohabitant in
reasonable fear of imminent physical harm. [R: 532-538]. While acknowledging
Ms. Marshall may have felt his actions were unpleasant or even irritating, none
of her grievances rose to the level of a protective order violation. [Id.]. Ms.
Marshall conceded the order that they use ACAFS to oversee parent-time
exchanges had resolved their November 2012 custody dispute. [Id.] And to the
extent there was a problem with the manner in which he paid his court-ordered
child support, he would gladly stipulate to an order that going forward he
would pay it through the Utah Office of Recovery Services. [Id.] There had been
no communication between the parties themselves in years and he had not done
anything to threaten Ms. Marshall's physical safety. [Id.]
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While implicitly conceding she had not demonstrated a reasonable fear of
future physical harm, Ms. Marshall nevertheless urged the court in closing to
adopt a broad definition of "abuse" as anything constituting domestic violence
under Utah Code 77-36-1 rather than how Section 78B-7-102 defined it. [R:538].
She contended the Court was not "tied to the definition [of "abuse"] in 78B-710211 and Mr. Card's act of depositing his court-ordered support checks into her

account and having a process server deliver them constituted stalking because it
annoyed, distressed, and intimidated her. [R:539].

In rebuttal, Mr. Card pointed out the Legislature had plainly defined
"abuse" as "physical harm" in the statute. [R:540-542]. He had not done anything
to harass Ms. Marshall via electronic communication, nor had he done anything
to threaten her physical safety or cause her significant emotional distress. [R:542544]. The parties already had orders in their divorce action resolving their prior
custody dispute and there was no compelling reason to continue the Protective
Order as a punitive measure against Mr. Card. [R:544].
After taking a brief recess, the court stated it felt Ms. Marshall had
demonstrated a reasonable fear of future abuse warranting a continuation of the
Protective Order despite her testimony that "she ... doesn't have a fear of future
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abuse." [R:545]. The court made various conclusory findings that Mr. Card had
violated the protective order and continued to engage in violations and other
unspecified provocative actions designed to harass and intimidate Ms. Marshall.
[R:395]. Even though there was nothing in the Protective Order prohibiting him
from doing so, [R:38-44 ], the judge concluded it was "alarming and
disconcerting" Mr. Card would deposit his court-ordered child support
payments into Ms. Marshall's bank account or have a process server deliver them
which surely must have been "a deliberate act to harass, intimidate, and
emotionally upset her." [R:395-396]. However, it did not say that constituted a
violation of the Protective Order. [Id.]
Even though the "Civil Portion" of the Protective Order authorizing Mr.
Card to go to Ms. Marshall's home to exchange their child had expired in
November 2012, [R:514-516, 525, 40-42 and Utah Code 78B-7-106(6)(a)], the court
chided him for insisting that Ms. Marshall exchange their child at a McDonalds
in Lehi instead when there was no order specifically requiring that. [R:395]. The
court described Mr. Card's conduct as a violation of the order" but did not
11

identify what part of the Order he violated. [Id.]. It also found Mr. Card was not
aware his behavior constituted a violation. [Id.]
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The Court described Mr. Card as "rigid, if not obsessive, about following
his narrow and self-serving interpretation of various rules." [R:394]. As a specific
example of such "rigidness," the Court stated there was "no requirement for
electronic communications between the parties, but he is fixated in his belief that
he was illegally denied the right to such communications." [R:394-395]. Yet, there
had been no testimony about that issue. [R:480-551 ].
While finding Mr. Card had completed domestic violence counseling and
paid a fine, the Court stated he had not internalized the principles of that course.
[R:395-396]. The Court accordingly ordered that the Protective Order remain in
effect and sanctioned Mr. Card for asking to lift it by ordering him to pay all of
Ms. Marshall's attorney fees. [R:396-397]. The Court further ordered that Mr.
Card was not allowed to deposit his child support into Ms. Marshall's bank
account and was prohibited from knowing where she lived with their daughter.
[Id.]
In response, Mr. Card asked the Court for guidance as to what conditions
he could fulfill to eventually have the Protective Order dismissed? [R:550]. The
Court vaguely responded "time" and "some behavior that would alleviate Ms.
Marshall's fear." [Id.]. In response to Mr. Card's inquiry as to how much time the
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Court had in mind, the Judge responded "I don't know." [Id.].
The Judge directed Ms. Marshall's counsel to prepare findings of fact and
an order incorporating his ruling and "as much of the relevant information in
the commissioner's order and recommendation as well" stating "Mr. Card
violated the protective order while it was in force initially." [R: 549]. Mr. Card
asked the Court what specific "violations" of the Protective Order it was finding
he committed. [R:549-550]. The Court vaguely answered:
"[A]ll the ones supported here today. And anything that, you know, I, I
don't take any- I think those are sufficient in and of themselves today,
But, um, you can also reference the commissioner's recommendation that
brought it here. And what I'd like [Ms. Marshall's counsel] to do is submit
it to [Mr. Card's counsel] for approval as to form. And, and I'll have the
final say on it anyways, so. Okay." [R:550].
The Judge did not cite any specific provision of the Protective Order that
Mr. Card violated. Nor did it explain how Mr. Card violated the Order.
Following trial, Mr. Card submitted an objection as to form arguing that
Ms. Marshall and the Judge's findings of fact were insufficiently detailed to
explain what he had done that constituted a Protective Order violation. [R:337347, 367-370.] Mr. Card also objected to Ms. Marshall inserting certain findings

made by the Commissioner that were not consistent with the Judge's oral
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findings or the evidence presented at trial. [Id.] In response, the Judge modified
Ms. Marshall's proposed findings somewhat but did not make any additional
subsidiary findings concerning the who, what, when, where, and how of Mr.
Card's alleged Protective Order violations. [R:392-400]. The Judge also kept the
Commissioner's findings in his order. [R:392-400, 480-552]. Mr. Card now
appeals that decision. [R:404].

Summary of the Argument
The Protective Order against Mr. Card should be dismissed because
during the three years it had been in effect he did nothing that would give his
former wife, Ms. Marshall, an objectively reasonable fear of future "abuse." The
plain language of the Protective Order statute defines "abuse" as intentionally
"placing a cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm." Because
they have a child together, ongoing contact between them was inevitable in spite
of their divorce and would inherently involve interactions that were annoying,
intimidating, and disconcerting at times. However, an ongoing Protective Order
is warranted only if that interaction would cause a reasonable person to fear
future "physical harm." The court made no finding that Ms. Marshall reasonably
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feared future physical harm.
The court below based its erroneous decision to keep the Protective Order
on the flawed legal conclusion it was not tied to the statutory definition of
"abuse" and could interpret it as encompassing anything that might annoy,
intimidate, or emotionally distress one's former spouse even if it was not of a
physically threatening nature. With that mistaken legal premise in mind, it
"found" Mr. Card's act of sending his court-ordered child support payments to
Ms. Marshall by mail, direct deposit, or process server and their dispute over the
logistics of a custody exchange in November 2012 warranted an ongoing
Protective Order because it was emotionally distressing to her. Because the
district court "findings" are premised on an erroneous underlying conclusion of
law, they are not entitled to any deference.
Likewise, although the trial court stated it thought some of Mr. Card's
behavior violated the Protective Order, it failed to explain what part of the Order
he violated. Nor did it provide a logical nexus between those supposed
violations and its ultimate legal conclusion that Ms. Marshall harbored a
reasonable fear of future "abuse" as the term is defined by statute.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the district court and vacate the
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Protective Order against Mr. Card. Alternatively, this Court should remand this
matter to the district court with instructions to provide more detailed findings
and reconsider its decision based upon the correct legal definition of "abuse."

Legal Analysis
This appeal concerns the trial court's failure to apply the proper statutory
definition of "abuse" to the facts of the case. The trial court's findings do not
logically support its legal conclusion that Ms. Marshall harbored a reasonable
fear of future "abuse" - which the statute defines as "physical harm" - thereby
justifying a continuation of what is now a four year old Protective Order. The
trial court's decision to keep the Order in place was premised on the erroneous
notion the statutory definition of "abuse" encompassed any behavior between
divorced parents that might be considered emotionally distressing. The Court
was unable to point to any occasion where Mr. Card threatened Ms. Marshall's
physical safety while the Order was in effect.
Furthermore, the trial court's conclusory finding that Mr. Card violated the
Protective Order is so lacking in subsidiary detail that it precludes meaningful
appellate review. Nowhere did the trial court find that Mr. Card's conduct
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satisfied the legal definition of stalking or any other domestic violence offense.
Consequently, this Court should vacate the Protective Order or remand
this case to the trial court with instructions to provide more detailed findings and
reconsider whether to vacate that Order based the correction definition of
"abuse."
In addition, it is worth noting that the marshaling requirement does not
apply under these circumstances. Where a trial court's finding "[ a ]re legally
inadequate, the exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of the findings
becomes futile and the appellant is under no obligation to marshal." Barnes v.
Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). In such a case, the "appellant can
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed."
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991); See also State v.
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 'i['i[ 33-44, 326 P.3d 645 (eliminating the "every scrap"
requirement and urging courts to focus on the merits).
This brief proceeds as follows. First, Mr. Card will address the trial court's
faulty interpretation of the statutory definition of "abuse." Second, how that
mistaken interpretation led it to "find" Ms. Marshall harbored a reasonable fear
of future "abuse" when what it had in mind was not what the statute
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contemplated. Third, how the trial court's findings are inadequately detailed to
sustain its conclusion that Mr. Card violated the Protective Order while it was in
effect. Based on those errors of law, this Court should reverse the decision of the
court below or, at a minimum, remand this case with instructions to reconsider
its decision based on correct legal principles.

I.

As a matter of law, Mr. Card's complained-of conduct did not justify
continuing the Protective Order in effect for almost four years.
A. To continue a Protective Order after two years have passed the
District Court must find the petitioner harbors an objectively
reasonable fear of future physical violence.
The remedy of a Protective Order between divorcing spouses is

deliberately narrow. To obtain such an Order in the first place a petitioner must
prove she has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence or that there is a
substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence. See Utah Code 78B-7-103.
Once such an Order is issued, however, it is subject to dismissal after two years if
"the court determines that the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of future
abuse." Utah Code 78B-7-115(1)(emphasis added).

Utah Code 78B-7-102(1) defines "abuse" as "intentionally or knowingly
causing or attempting to cause a cohabitant physical harm or ... placing a
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cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm." Thus, under the plain
language of the statute4 to conclude that a cohabitant harbors a reasonable fear of

future "abuse" the court must make a subsidiary finding that the respondent's
conduct would cause a reasonable person in the petitioner's circumstances to
fear they would suffer "imminent physical harm" if the Protective Order went
away. Cf. Meyer v. Aposhian, 2016 UT App 47, <JI 22 (explaining the Protective
Order statute calls for an objective inquiry).
As part of the process of determining whether a petitioner harbors an
objectively reasonable fear of future "abuse," the court considers factors like:
(a) whether the respondent has complied with treatment recommendations
related to domestic violence, entered at the time the protective order
was entered;
(b) whether the protective order was violated during the time it was in
force;
(c) claims of harassment, abuse, or violence by either party during the time
the protective order was in force;
(d) counseling or therapy undertaken by either party;
(e) impact on the well-being of any minor children of the parties, if
relevant; and
(f) any other factors the court considers relevant to the case before it.

4
The primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative
intent as evidenced by the plan language of the statute. Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53,
<j{ 11,250 P.3d 994. Only when there is ambiguity in the plain language of a
statute will a court seek guidance from the legislative history or other policy
considerations. Id.
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Utah Code 78B-7-115(1)

In a given case, as here, not all of these factors will apply. 5 However, under
the plain language of the statutory definition of "abuse," the ultimate inquiry is
determining whether the petitioner harbors an objectively reasonable fear of
"imminent physical harm." In the absence of such, the court cannot keep the
Order in place as a punitive measure.
For example, in the recent case of Meyer v. Aposhian this Court affirmed
the dismissal of a Protective Order even though the respondent engaged in
conduct that was "upsetting, intimidating, and annoying" towards his ex-wife
because she failed to show his behavior was likely to "escalate to violence." 2016
UT App 47 at <J[ 16. "Contentious divorces" by their very nature "cause emotional
distress" and involve behavior that is "annoying, painful, or intimidating." Id.
<J[<J[ 16 and 24. But, emotionally distressing interactions between divorced parents

must be more significant than that to warrant an ongoing Protective Order. Id.
While such interactions do not have to involve "outrageous" conduct to be

5
For example, the court did not enter any treatment recommendations or
require counseling/therapy when it entered the original Protective Order.
However, it did find that Mr. Card nevertheless underwent counseling.
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actionable, the statute does not contemplate transforming every unpleasant
interaction between divorced parents into the basis for a Protective Order. Id. <JI1
24 and 29 n.3.
i.

There is no reasonable basis to conclude Mr. Card's act of
sending his court-ordered child support checks to Ms. Marshall
via mail, direct deposit, or a process server would give her
reasonable cause to fear imminent physical violence.

The trial court concluded Ms. Marshall demonstrated a reasonable fear of
"abuse" because for a period of time Mr. Card sent his court-ordered child
support payments to her by mail, process server, or direct deposit into her bank.
However, Mr. Card never had any direct or attempted contact with Ms. Marshall
during these transfers of money. There were no letters in the envelopes besides
the support check itself. There was also no order requiring Mr. Card to go
through the Office of Recovery Services to pay child support.
Consequently, as in Meyer there was no reasonable basis to conclude that
Ms. Marshall harbored an objectively reasonable fear she would suffer imminent

physical harm if the Protective Order were dismissed. While Mr. Card's method
of sending his court-ordered child support payments to Ms. Marshall may have
been disconcerting to her, as a matter of law it was not physically threatening nor
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likely to provoke a violent encounter. Thus, the trial court's decision cannot
stand based on how Section 78B-7-102(1) defines "abuse."
To be sure, it was certainly within the Judge's discretion to clarify the child
support provisions in their Divorce Decree going forward and specify that Mr.
Card was not required to send his support payments directly to Ms. Marshall. If
Mr. Card did not obey that clarified order then the Judge would be justified in
exercising his contempt powers to compel his obedience. But, however
disconcerting Mr. Card's prior method of paying child support may have been, it
was not physically threatening and thus, by definition, not "abuse."
ii.

There is no reasonable basis to conclude the fact Mr. Card
knew where Ms. Marshall lived would give her reasonable
cause to fear for her physical safety when they had a child
together and the Protective Order itself told him where she
lived.

Ms. Marshall contended she harbored a reasonable fear of future "abuse"
because Mr. Card knew where she lived. However, that is neither surprising nor
inappropriate because they have a minor child together whom Mr. Card has
statutory parental rights to. As a parent, Mr. Card has a right to know where his
child lives if for no reason other than emergency contact purposes. See Utah
Code 30-3-33(13)("Each parent shall provide the other with the parent's current
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address ... "); 30-3-36(2)(explaining divorced parents should inform each other
where their child can be reached in the event of an emergency while travelling).
Even the parties' original Protective Order identified where Ms. Marshall lived
and allowed him to go there for custody exchanges for a period of time. [R:38, 40,
42]. Nothing in the Order stated Mr. Card was prohibited from knowing where
she lived.
While there is no denying that the parties' divorce proceeding was
contentious (as many are), Mr. Card never had any direct contact with Ms.
Marshall since their original Protective Order was entered in 2012. The Court
made no finding that he ever expressed threats of violence. There is no finding
that he ever went by her home for any reason other than custody exchanges as
permitted by their Protective Order for a period of time. [R:41-42].
Consequently, there was no reasonable basis to conclude the fact Mr. Card
knew where his child lived with Ms. Marshall and sent his child support checks
there would reasonably cause to her to fear bodily harm.
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iii.

There is no reasonable basis to conclude a disagreement over
the logistics of a custody exchange in November 2012 would
give Ms. Marshall reasonable cause to fear for her physical
safety.

The court below opined that Ms. Marshall had reasonable cause to fear
"abuse" because Mr. Card proposed exchanging their child at a McDonalds in
Lehi at the conclusion of a custody exchange when there was no order requiring
that. However, at the time the "Civil Portion" 6 of their Protective Order had
expired and it was unclear where Mr. Card was now supposed to meet her for
that exchange. [R:41-42]. 7 Prior to that time, the parties met at Ms. Marshall's

6
A domestic relations Protective Order contains two parts: a "Criminal"
and "Civil" portion. See Utah Code 78B-7-106(5). The "Criminal" portion
generally contains provisions restricting the respondent from contacting or
abusing the petitioner, the violation of which constitutes a crime. Conversely, the
"Civil" portion contains provisions specifying who will have temporary custody
of the parties' child(ren) and how they will conduct parent-time exchanges while
the Order is in effect, the violation of which is punishable as contempt but not
considered a crime. Courts often insert exceptions to the "no contact" provisions
in the "Criminal" portion of a Protective Order within this "Civil" section to
allow the respondent to meet the petitioner for the limited purpose of
exchanging their child(ren). However, unless the court orders otherwise this
"Civil" portion automatically expires after 150 days. See Utah Code 78B-7106(6)(a). This can cause problems and confusion when, as here, the "Criminal"
and "Civil" portions of a Protective Order were intended to work in tandem.
7
Per Utah Code 78B-7-106(6)(a), the "Civil" Portion of the Protective Order
would have expired on or about September 13, 2012-150 days after it was
issued in April 2012.
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Lehi home for custody exchanges because the Civil Portion authorized it. [Id.]
However, once the Civil part expired Mr. Card was concerned she would falsely
accuse him of violating the Order if he went by Ms. Marshall's residence to
relinquish their child. 8 He tried to negotiate an alternate location to exchange the
child with Ms. Marshall's father via text messaging that did not violate the
Protective Order. But, they were unable to resolve the issue on their own until
the local police intervened. During that conversation he made the statement he
was uncomfortable relinquishing the child to anyone unless Ms. Marshall was in
the car. However, he clarified he did not want any contact with her and merely
wanted to know their child was going back to her.
While the court below was technically correct there was no order requiring
/'\
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Ms. Marshall herself to receive the child at the end of a parent-time exchange, the
problem was the Protective Order did not say where Mr. Card was supposed to
meet her for exchanges once the Civil Portion of the Order expired. [R:38-44]. This
ambiguity and other disputes led the divorce court to subsequently enter an

8
This fear was prompted by Ms. Marshall's propensity to repeatedly accuse
Mr. Card of violating the Protective Order, all of which were eventually
dismissed.
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order directing the parties to utilize ACAFS 9 to coordinate the logistics of parenttime exchanges. That resolved the problem going forward.
It is noteworthy Ms. Marshall conceded she had no reason to fear being

physically harmed at this exchange because the police were there. [R:494]. Ms.
Marshall likewise conceded their divorce court's subsequent order that the
parties use ACAFS to coordinate exchanges resolved that problem going
forward. [R:247, 499].
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, this court upheld Utah's stalking statute against
a First Amendment challenge because the statute's prohibition against causing a
cohabitant "emotional distress" was not so overbroad as to encompass "limited
conduct during legitimate innocent encounters" such as divorced parents
meeting each other for a custody exchange "without conduct directed at causing
physical harm." 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997). Yet, under the trial court's logic
any disagreement about the logistics of a custody exchange could become the
catalyst for a Protective Order even without any threat of violence if a parent
found that dispute to be annoying, intimidating, or harassing. That would run

9

ACAFS is a facility in Utah County that supervises custody exchanges.
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directly contrary to this Court's analysis in Lopez and Meyer .10
Given these circumstances, there was no reasonable basis for concluding a
Protective Order was necessary to prevent future physical violence.
B. Mere "claims" of harassment or a protective order violation do not
justify extending a Protective Order.
r·.'>
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The court below apparently relied on the fact Mr. Card had been
"charged" with violating the protective order to support its conclusory finding
that he had violated it. [R:392]. However, the parties stipulated those charges
were all subsequently dropped or dismissed on appeal. [Id.]. Consequently,
those charges carried no collateral preclusive effect. 11 To the extent the court's

10
Recall that in Meyer this Court held that annoying, intimidating, and
harassing behavior between a divorced couple was not enough to justify a
Protective Order unless accompanied by a threat of physical violence or
something that would cause significant emotional distress beyond what is
inherent in contentious divorces.
11
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f (1982)(a "judgment
ceases to be final if it is in fact set aside by the trial court[.]"). The majority of
jurisdictions follow the Restatement position. See e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank
v. Tohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1146 (2d Cir.1992), aff'd, 510
U.S. 86, 114 S.Ct. 517, 126 L.Ed.2d 524 (1993) (vacated judgment has no preclusive
effect); Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 339, 340-41 (7th
Cir.1991) (vacated judgments have no future effect); Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d
442,444 (6th Cir.1985) ("judgment which is vacated, for whatever reason, is
deprived of its conclusive effect as collateral estoppel"); Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d
381, 383 (Alaska 1994)(vacated judgment cannot have res judicata effect because
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findings relied upon those charges for that purpose, it engaged in plain error.
Furthermore, any charge that resulted in a dismissal following a "no contest"
plea could not be considered evidence of a violation because such pleas are
inadmissible in collateral civil proceedings. See Utah R. of Evid. § 410(a)(2); See
also State ex. rel. W.A., 2002 UT 127, <JI'Il 33-36, 63 P.3d 607 (Explaining a "no
contest" plea is not admissible as evidence of any wrongdoing).
Nevertheless, the court analogized proceedings to dismiss a protective
order to a probation violation hearing in that it did not have to find Mr. Card
was criminally convicted of a violation to conclude a violation occurred. Cf. Layton
City v. Stevenson, 2014 UT 37,337 P.3d 242 (to prove a criminal defendant
violated his probation the state does not have to provide proof of a criminal
conviction and need only show under a preponderance standard that a violation
occurred). However, that misses the point because the court must still find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Card's conduct constitutes a Protective

it is not a final judgment); Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial
Assurance Co., 147 Misc.2d 804,556 N.Y.S.2d 183, 187 (App.Div.1989) (vacatur of
a judgment, as a general rule, "is not a meaningless act for the purposes of issue
preclusion"); Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., 306 N.J.Super. 61, 703
A.2d 306,316 (App.Div.1997)(vacated judgment is not a final judgment for
purposes of collateral estoppel).
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Order violation and explain how.
To be sure, there is language in Section 78B-7-115(1)(c) suggesting the
court should consider "claims" of harassment, abuse, or violence while a
Protective Order is in force in deciding whether to keep it. But, a "claim" is
nothing more than an allegation (and may be unfounded at that). Thus, consistent

Q

with the district court's analogy to a probation violation hearing, unless it
actually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Card engaged in abusive
behavior towards the petitioner while the Protective Order was in effect it cannot
rely upon mere "claims" of such conduct to justify keeping that Order.
C. Mr. Card did not violate the Protective Order while it was in effect
and the trial court's legal conclusion to the contrary is not
supported by adequately detailed subsidiary findings.
To find that Mr. Card violated the Protective Order, the evidence must
show that he "knew what was required" of him, "had the ability to comply," and
"intentionally failed or refused" to do so. State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356, <I[ 11,
245 P.3d 213 (explaining test for proving violation of a court order); Utah Code
Q

76-5-108(1)(to prove a Protective Order violation it must be shown that the
defendant acted "intentionally and knowingly"). A court cannot find a party
intentionally violated an order unless it is so "specific," "clear," "unambiguous,"

Q
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and "definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning."
L.A., 2010 UT App 356 at <JI 13 (emphasis added). To the extent there is room for
debate about what an order requires or prohibits, a court cannot fault a party for
misunderstanding an unclear order. Id.
For example, in L.A. a juvenile court held a parent in contempt for
violating an order to deliver her son to a mandatory probation meeting. Id. <j[ 9
This Court reversed that finding of contempt because the underlying order she
was charged with violating "was not so specific and definite as to give [her]
notice that she had been ordered by the juvenile court to comply with any and all
of [a probation officer's] directives." Id. <JI 11-19. The Order required her to
"attend meetings ... as directed" but did not specify what meetings she was
supposed to attend or who would make that decision. Id. <Jl 13-14. Because the
juvenile court could have more precise, this Court concluded it was reversible
error to find that the mother "knew what was required" of her and thereby
violated the Order. Id. <JI 16-18.
Furthermore, a trial court's findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed to
allow a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's decision was rationally
based upon the relevant facts and controlling legal principles. Roberts v. Roberts,
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2014 UT App 211, <j{ 10, 335 P.3d 378. While trial courts are not expected to
analyze every issue in the same depth as an appellate decision, Id., the
touchstone of adequate findings is that they are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached. Adequate findings of fact are essential to enable
meaningful appellate review because without them an appellate court cannot
understand the trial court's reasoning and thereby assess its compliance with

Q

governing law. Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, <I[ 29, 351 P.3d 90. Failure to do
so is grounds for reversal and remand for entry of additional findings of fact.
For example, in Towner v. Ridgway our Supreme Court reversed and
remanded a civil stalking injunction because the trial court failed to make
specific findings with respect to each element of the stalking statute. 2008 UT 23,
<fi<f[ 13-16, 182 P.3d 347. Although the trial court found Mr. Ridgway's actions

constituted a "course of conduct" giving the Towners a "reasonable basis for
fearing Mr. Ridgway," it did not find they feared bodily injury or significant
i'.

emotional distress as required by the stalking statute. Id.

\;',/!ii

Here, as in Towner and L.A., the trial court's findings are inadequately
detailed to justify its legal conclusion that Mr. Card violated the Protective Order
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while it was in effect. Although the Court said it "found" Mr. Card violated it, it
did not enter subsidiary findings explaining (1) what part of the order put Mr.
Card on notice that his complained-of conduct was prohibited, (2) that he
understood the Order and had the ability to comply, and (3) how his behavior
constituted intentional and knowing disobedience - as distinguished from a
mistaken interpretation - of the Order. 12
While there was some argument from Ms. Marshall's counsel that Mr.
Card's conduct constituted "stalking/' the trial court never found that it did. Nor
did it enter any subsidiary findings stating that Mr. Card did anything to cause
Ms. Marshall to fear bodily injury or suffer significant emotional distress as
required by the statute. Towner, 2008 UT 23 at <JI 16; Meyer, 2016 UT App 47 at
<Jf<Il 11, 16, and 29 n. 3 (Explaining emotional distress must be "significant;" mere

anxiety or annoyance incident to a contentious divorce is not enough).
In the absence of adequately detailed findings explaining the trial court's

12
It is noteworthy that the trial court appeared to make a specific finding
that Mr. Card sincerely believed he had not engaged in any conduct that would
constitute a Protective Order violation. [R:395]. Suffice it to say, that is
irreconcilable with a finding that any violation on his part was done intentionally
or knowingly.
47

reasoning for concluding Mr. Card violated the Protective Order, this court
should reverse its decision as contrary to law or, at a minimum, remand with
instructions to provide more detailed findings and reconsider its decision.

i.

Nothing in the Protective Order prohibited Mr. Card from sending
his court-ordered child support directly to Ms. Marshall.

It is unclear whether the trial court considered Mr. Card's act of sending

his court-ordered child support payments directly to Ms. Marshall a violation of
the Protective Order because it never actually said it was. Nor did it reference the
part of the Order he allegedly violated. Nevertheless, assuming such a finding
was implicit it was erroneous.
The Protective Order broadly prohibits Mr. Card from doing anything
constituting abuse, domestic violence, stalking, harassment, or threatening
physical violence. [R:39]. It likewise prohibits him from directly or indirectly
contacting or communicating with the Petitioner. [R:40]. Ms. Marshall conceded
their Divorce Decree ordered Mr. Card to pay her child support. [R:499].
Although Ms. Marshall professed that Mr. Card should be sending his support
payments through the Office of Recovery Services, she was unable to cite any
provision in their Decree or the Protective Order that regulated the manner in
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Q

which he delivered his support. [R:501-503, 507]. 13 She admitted Mr. Card did

not include anything with his child support checks besides the check itself and
the envelope it was in. [Id.]. Mr. Card did not attempt to communicate with Ms.
Marshall in any way while sending his child support to her. [R:500-501].
Consequently, as a matter of law Mr. Card's act of complying with the
Divorce Decree's requirement that he pay child support to Ms. Marshall each
month cannot be described as a "violation" of the Protective Order because
nothing in that Order or their Decree prohibited him from paying his courtordered support by mail, direct deposit, or process server. While the Court was

certainly free to clarify its orders going forward, under L.A. it was not at liberty
to amend the Order ex post facto and then say Mr. Card violated it.
ii.

The dispute over the logistics of a custody exchange in November
2012 did not constitute a violation of the Protective Order.

It is unfortunate the parties had a disagreement over the logistics of a

13
Paragraph 3 of the Divorce Decree drafted by Ms. Marshall's counsel
stated: "Mr. Card shall pay Aria $429 per month as child support, effective as of
November 1, 2013 and continuing until the child has attained the age of eighteen
years or graduated from high school with her class, whichever comes later, plus
one-half of any work related child care costs, medical expenses, and medical
insurance premiums that are paid on [their child's] behalf." The Decree says
nothing about Mr. Card paying through the Office of Recovery Services.
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custody exchange on November 25, 2012. However, to find that Mr. Card's
request that the parties exchange their child at a McDonalds in Lehi - a public
place - "violated" the Protective Order was erroneous because the Court did not
show where its Order provided Mr. Card with a clear, definite answer to the
question of how they were supposed to conduct that exchange and where they
were to meet after the "Civil Portion" expired in 2012. [R:38-44].
Because the relevant provisions of the Protective Order were unclear at

r--,

V;,,/

best, Mr. Card did not have "specific and definite" notice of what was required
of him. He reasonably believed the "Civil Portion" of the Order authorizing him

Q

to go to Ms. Marshall's residence for parent-time exchanges had expired by
operation of law and he would be violating the protective order if he showed up
there. 14 It was undisputed the parties had no direct contact with each other at this

14
The very first page of the Protective Order expressly warned Mr. Card
"YOU CAN BE ARRESTED FOR VIOLATING THIS ORDER EVEN IF THE
PERSON PROTECTED BY THE ORDER INVITES OR ALLOWS YOU TO
VIOLATE THE ORDER'S PROHIBITIONS.ONLY THE COURT CAN
CHANGE THE ORDER. YOU MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING
OR ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER." [R:38]. In other words, if Mr.
Card showed up at Ms. Marshall's house to relinquish their child she could have
had him arrested and held in contempt for violating the Protective Order even if
she told him to come there.
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exchange, nor did Mr. Card ask to have any direct contact with Ms. Marshall.
Indeed, even the trial court's ruling suggests it found that Mr. Card believed he
was obeying the Order, albeit in a manner that walked "close to the line" as he
understood it without "technically cross[ing] it." [R:395].
While the court below evidently disagreed with Mr. Card's interpretation,
his actions did not and could not constitute an "intentional" and "knowing"
violation of that Order. Thus, to the extent the court below based its conclusion
that Ms. Marshall harbored a reasonable fear of future abuse because Mr. Card
violated the order while it was in effect, that conclusion was erroneous.
111.

The district court did not articulate any other Protective Order
violations.

Aside from the dispute over a custody exchange on November 25, 2012,
the trial court did not specifically identify any other incidents as constituting a
violation of the Protective Order. Nor did it make subsidiary findings of fact
explaining how that unspecified conduct constituted a protective order violation.
Mr. Card invited the trial court to provide more detailed findings to support its
conclusions both at oral argument, [R:549-550), and again in his post-trial
objection to form. [R:337-347]. However, the trial court declined to provide
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additional subsidiary findings. [R:393-397].
Ordinarily, the absence of adequately detailed findings of fact justifies a
remand for entry of more detailed findings by the court and reconsideration of
its decision. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 478 ("when multiple conflicting versions of
the facts create a matrix of possible factual findings, we are unable on appeal to
assume that any given finding was in fact made."). The only exception is when
the evidence in the record is undisputed and only capable of supporting the trial

Q

court's decision. Id. But, a canvassing of the record in this case reveals the
evidence either does not support the trial court's decision or, at best, is disputed
thereby making affirmance as a matter of law impossible.
Given these deficiencies, this Court should either outright reject the trial
court's legal conclusion that Mr. Card violated the Protective Order or,
alternatively, should remand for entry of more detailed findings of fact and
C,
'iW

reconsideration of the trial court's prior legal conclusion. Id. at 479 (explaining
when an appellate court remands for additional findings it does not expect the
trial court to engage in an "exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion
already reached" but to reconsider that conclusion as well).
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D. The district court erred by incorporating several of the
Commissioner's findings into its ruling even though no evidence
was presented to support them at trial.

Under Utah R. of Civ. P. 108(d)(2), any party has the right, upon request, to
an evidentiary hearing before a judge when objecting to a commissioner's
recommendation in a protective order matter. At this hearing the judge "will
make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence,
whether by proffer, testimony, or exhibit, presented to the judge." Utah R. of Civ.
P. 108(f). It is not improper for a district court to adopt a commissioner's findings
and ruling as its own when its reasoning does not differ from that of the
commissioner. Pingree v. Pingree, 2015 UT App 302, <JI 10 citing Veysey v.
Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, <JI 17, 339 P.3d 131. But, it is erroneous for a judge to
adopt a commissioner's findings when no evidence is "presented to the judge" to
support them. A finding of fact not supported by admissible evidence is
considered clearly erroneous and will be disregarded on appeal. Larson v.
Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 725 (Utah App. 1994).
Here, the trial court incorporated all of the Commissioner's findings into
its ruling even though no evidence was presented to support many of them.
[R:393-394]. By doing so, the trial court violated Civil Rule 108(d)(2).
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For example, the Judge stated the Commissioner in the divorce case
reported Mr. Card to the Salt Lake County Attorney to consider filing criminal
charges against him for an alleged extortion attempt against Ms. Marshal.

Q

[R:394]. However, no evidence was presented to support that claim at trial.
[R:480-552]. Nor did the judge make any subsidiary findings explaining what he

did that constituted "extortion" under Utah Code 76-6-406, much less how it
would give Ms. Marshall reasonable grounds to think she would suffer "abuse" -

imminent physical harm - if the Protective Order were dismissed. This Court
should reject that finding as clearly erroneous.
The Judge found Mr. Card threatened Ms. Marshall's counsel with a Bar
complaint unless counsel made a public statement disparaging the
Commissioner who initially granted the Protective Order. [R:394]. However, no
evidence was presented to the judge in support of that claim. [R:480-552]. Neither
Ms. Marshall nor her counsel choose to testify about any such complaint or
request to disparage a commissioner. [Id.] That finding should be rejected.
Nevertheless, even assuming for argument's sake the Court had been
presented with admissible evidence about Mr. Card threatening to file a Bar
complaint- and it was not- it did not explain how it would give Ms. Marshall a
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Q

reasonable basis to fear she would suffer imminent physical harm. Litigants
sometimes feel an adverse ruling is attributable to bias rather than the merits of
their case and may encourage others to take action through lawful channels to
remove the offending judicial officer from the bench. While any public statement
disparaging a judicial officer is ill-advised, it does not logically follow a person
making such a statement is going to resort to physical violence. Rather, the
"threat" found by the court below was that Mr. Card would ask the State Bar to
investigate Ms. Marshall's counsel. There is nothing physically threatening about
that. The Bar is the entity charged with investigating claims of attorney
misconduct. Assuming Mr. Card's complaint was unmeritorious, the Bar would
screen it out and that would be the end of it. And if the Bar thought there was
merit to Mr. Card's grievance then it would investigate the matter and respond
appropriately.
Either way, the fact the court found Mr. Card would rely upon the legal
system to resolve his grievances rather than taking matters into his own hands
undermines its conclusion that Ms. Marshall harbors a reasonable fear of future
"abuse."
The court stated Mr. Card harbored a "rigid, if not obsessive ... narrow
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and self-serving interpretation of various rules" as a reason for keeping the
Protective Order in place and cited as an example Mr. Card being fixated on the
belief that he was entitled to "electronic communications between the parties"
and was "illegally denied the right to such communications." [R:394-395].
However, no evidence was presented to support that contention. [R:480-552].
Indeed, it is unclear from the record what "electronic communications" the Judge
was even referring to that Mr. Card supposedly felt he had been "illegally
denied." Thus, that finding should be rejected.
Regardless, the court below offered no analysis explaining how any belief
by Mr. Card that he had been unjustly denied the right to "electronic

communications" would lead to him engaging in physical violence against Ms.
Marshall if the Protective Order was dismissed.
E. The lower court's other reasons for keeping the Protective Order
in place are irrelevant to the question of whether Ms. Marshall
harbors a reasonable fear of future "abuse."
The trial court referenced Mr. Card's litigiousness as a pro se litigant in the
early stages of his divorce case as a basis for concluding that Ms. Marshall
harbored a reasonable fear of future abuse. [R:393]. However, that conclusion
makes no sense. We want people to turn to the legal system to resolve disputes
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rather than resorting to self-help. Thus, the trial court's finding that Mr. Card
repeatedly turned to the courts to resolve his grievances with Ms. Marshall
undermines its conclusion that he is likely to resort to violence to settle disputes.
Court rules already provide remedies to deal with prose litigants who
engage in vexatious litigation such as attorney fee awards, pre-filing restrictions,
and requiring litigants to obtain counsel before proceeding further. See generally
Utah R. of Civ. P. 83. An ongoing Protective Order is only warranted to shield a
petitioner against a future physical harm; not allegedly vexatious litigation.
Finally, the Judge chastised Mr. Card for contacting the police over thirty
times to resolve parent-time disputes which eventually required "the need to use
ACAFS for parent-time exchanges" at his expense. [R:394]. However, Ms.
Marshall conceded the subsequent order that they use ACAFS for exchanges
resolved those problems. [R:499]. She conceded she had no reason to fear
physical violence when the police oversaw an exchange, and the current order
that they go through ACAFS resolved their ongoing parent-time disputes. [R:494,
499]. Thus, there was no logical basis for the trial court to conclude a Protective
Order was needed in addition to the ACAFS order.
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F. There is no compelling reason for keeping the Protective Order in
place.

A domestic relations Protective Order is not a mere civil injunction
prohibiting former cohabitants from contacting each other. Rather, under federal
and state law a Protective Order carries an assortment of collateral civil and
criminal legal consequences that effectively render a person subject to such an
order a second-class citizen. Thus, it stands as a significant barrier to Mr. Card's
ability to "get on with his life" at the trial court put it. [R:550].
For example, a person subject to a Protective Order cannot possess
firearms for lawful purposes such as protecting their home against burglars,
recreation, or hunting purposes even if they've never been accused of threatening to

use a weapon against someone. See 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(8). An otherwise innocent
respondent accused of violating a Protective Order is subject to a mandatory
arrest based on a mere "probable cause" standard. See Utah Code 77-36-2.4. In
child custody proceedings a Protective Order is considered evidence the
respondent poses a threat to his child's safety. See Utah Code 30-3-32(2)(c). In
many states a civil Protective Order will show up on a respondent's background
report thereby limiting his employment opportunities. See Jessica Miles, We Are
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Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence Victims, Defendants, and Due
Process, 142 Cardozo L. Rev. 141, 151-153 (2013). Similarly, applicants for higher
education, including medical and law school, may be required to disclose the
entry of a Protective Order against them which may negatively impact their
chance of admission. Id. Respondents subject to a protective order may also be
disqualified from serving as foster parents or kinship caretakers. Id. Last but not
least, there is an inherent social stigma associated with being subject to a
Protective Order. Id.
Many innocent acts that are not otherwise criminal offenses suddenly
become a crime in the shadow of a Protective Order. Id. For example, a
respondent who contacts his co-parent to innocently discuss their child's
progress in school or inquire about a prescription drug their child is taking could
be arrested and jailed even if that conversation did not involve anything
remotely threatening or harassing.
To be sure, the collateral legal consequences of a Protective Order are
arguably a good thing if the person protected by that Order has a legitimate,
reasonable basis to fear they will be physically assaulted without it. But, when, as
here, those collateral consequences are used as a sword by one divorced parent
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against the other to settle a score over grievances from long ago rather than a
shield against future violence, that Order is not only unnecessary but a means of
perpetrating further conflict.
II.

The trial court erred in assessing attorney fees against Mr. Card.

The trial court's decision to assess attorney fees against Mr. Card under
Utah Code 78B-7-115(3) because it believed his request to vacate the protective
order was brought in bad faith or with intent to harass or intimidate Ms.
Marshall is not supported by the evidence presented. It is likewise premised on
the district court's flawed legal conclusion that the statutory definition of
11

abuse" encompasses any kind of unpleasant interaction between divorced

parents. Cf. Granger v. Granger, 2016 UT App 67, <JI 10 (a discretionary decision
premised on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion).
At least two years had elapsed by the time Mr. Card brought this action to
vacate the protective order. He had had no direct contact with Ms. Marshall in
years outside of court proceedings. [R:487]. Ms. Marshall was unable to point to
any incident where Mr. Card had threatened her physical safety in the years
since their original protective order was issued. Thus, Mr. Card had a good faith
basis for seeking to dismiss their protective order on the grounds there had been
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no "abuse" between them as Utah Code 78B-7-102(1) defines that term.
For much the same reasons, there is no evidence to support the trial court's
conclusion that Mr. Card moved to dismiss the protective order with the intent of
harassing or intimidating Ms. Marshall. As stated supra, the trial court failed to
provide sufficient subsidiary findings of fact explaining what Mr. Card did that
constituted a violation of the order. There had been no threatening or abusive
interaction between the two of them since the Protective Order was issued. And
to the extent Ms. Marshall indicated she wanted Mr. Card's child support
payments to go through the Office of Recovery Services, he indicated he would
gladly stipulate to an order to that effect thereby mooting that grievance.
To be sure, in an abstract sense it could be said that the filing of any
motion with the court could be perceived as "harassing" or "intimidating" by the
ex-spouse who has to go to the trouble of responding to it. However, in Meyer
this Court rejected the argument that an ongoing protective order was warranted
because one spouse engaged in "upsetting, intimidating, and annoying" conduct
towards the other, reasoning that contentious divorces by their very nature
involved such behavior. 2016 UT App 47 at <jl<_II 16 and 24. If the Legislature
intended for the standard of awarding fees under Section 78B-7-115(3)(b) to be
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that low, it would have simply said that the non-prevailing party in protective
order litigation is subject to sanctions. But, that is not the standard they imposed.
Thus, the most sensible interpretation of the statute is that sanctions are only

G

permitted against a party for engaging in harassing or intimidating behavior
above and beyond what is inherent in a contentious divorce. Yet, the trial court
made no findings describing any behavior that could be fairly described as
reaching that standard.
Thus, irrespective of this court's ultimate decision on the merits of Mr.
Card's appeal of the trial court's decision not to dismiss the protective order, this
court should at least conclude Mr. Card brought his motion in good faith and not
with the intent of harassing or intimidating Ms. Marshall in excess of the
inherent unpleasantness of litigation and co-parenting in the aftermath of a
contentious divorce. On that basis it should reverse the trial court's award of
attorney fees to Ms. Marshall.
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Conclusion and Requested Relief
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's
decision to extend a domestic relations Protective Order against Mr. Card.
Alternatively, this Court should remand this matter to the trial court with
instructions to enter more detailed subsidiary findings of fact and reconsider its
ruling based on correct legal principles.
Respectfully submitted:
DATED THIS 2nd day of May, 2016.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV 13 20\5
~

Sall Lake County
BY=--------:::".:':-:.t=:~:i:'
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT

COURT

OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U'l'AB

ARIA RBBBKAB CARD,
nka Aria Marshall,

ORDER
CASE NO.

124901827

Petitioner,

vs.
Judge Paul G. Maughan

DEVIN JORN CARD,
Respondent.

The respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, filed
June 11, 2015, and respondent's Motion in Limine, filed August 17, 2015,
came before the Court for hearing on September 1, 2015.
("Ms.

Marshall")

was

The petitioner

present and represented by James

H.

Woodall.

Respondent ("Mr. Card") was present and represented by Scott B. Wiser.
The

Court,

having

reviewed

the

file,

the

Commissioner's

Recommendation, the pleadings herein, the testimony of the parties, and
the relevant case law, now enters the following Order.
Mr. Card's Motion in Limine is denied.

The court is not precluded

from considering the conduct that led to Mr. Card being charged with
criminal violations, even though those charges were ultimately dismissed
under plea agreements in a separate case.
The Court entered a Protective Order against Mr. Card on April 16,
2002 based on allegations of physical violence and sexual assault
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committed by Mr. Card against Ms. Marshall.

ORDER

Mr. Card is seeking the

dismissal of that Protective Order under Section 78B-7-115, Utah Code
Ann., claiming that Ms. Marshall no longer has a reasonable fear of
abuse.
The parties appeared before Commissioner Luhn on May 20, 2015.
Following

oral

arguments,

the

Commissioner

took

advisement and issued a Minute Entry on June 11, 2015.

the

matter

under

The Commissioner

recommended the denial of Mr. Card's Motion to Dismiss,

noting the

following: 1
1

Mr. Card was charged with violating the Protective Order three

times, albeit in 2012;
2

Mr.

Card was charged with custodial

inference once,

and

custodial interference with telephone harassment another time;
3

Mr. Card filed three requests for Protective Orders against

Ms. Marshall, the last one in Utah County after the Commissioner warned
him that he would be subject to sanctions if he filed another request
that was without merit.
4

Mr. Card filed three civil tort actions against Ms. Marshall,

her acquaintances, and her counsel.

'See, Commissioner's Recommendation dated June 11, 2015.
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ORDER

The Commissioner in the divorce case reported Mr. Card to the

Salt Lake County Attorney to consider filing criminal charges against Mr.
Card based on an extortion attempt against Ms. Marshall.
Mr.

6

complaint

Card

unless

threatened

counsel

made

Ms.
a

Marshall's
public

counsel

statement

with

a

Bar

disparaging

the

Commissioner who initially granted the Protective Order.
Mr. Card called the police over thirty times for parent time

7

disputes, requiring the need to use ACAFS for parent time exchanges, at
Mr. Card's expense.
Mr. Card insists that the Court apply a narrow definition of the
term "abuse," as that term is defined in Section 78B-7-102(1), Utah Code
The Court notes that section 78B-7-115,

Ann.

which discusses the

dismissal of protective orders, directs the Court to consider a number
of factors, including whether the protective order has been violated (b),
claims of harassment (c),
relevant (f).
Order.

and any other factors

the Court considers

The Court does find that Mr. Card violated the Protective

The Court also finds that Mr.

Card continues to engage in

violations, and provocative actions designed to harass and intimidate Ms.
Marshall.
The Court's observation of Mr. Card at numerous hearings has not
changed.

He remains rigid, if not obsessive, about following his narrow

and self-serving interpretation of various rules.

For example, there is

no requirement for electronic communications between the parties, but he
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is fixated in his belief that he was illegally denied the right to such
communications.

He ferreted out Ms. Marshall's banking information,

without Ms. Marshall's knowledge or consent, and deposited child support
checks into her account.

He reasoned that it was reasonable to do so

because it was consuming fewer public resources by not requiring a mail
handler or someone else to do the same job.

That such conduct by Mr.

Card, would be alarming and disconcerting to Ms. Marshall, or any other
reasonable person, did not dissuade Mr. Card.

The Court finds that this

was a deliberate act to harass, intimidate and emotionally upset her
while Mr. Card justified it as innocent and practicable.
He demanded that Ms. Marshall be physically present at a parent time
exchange in Lehi, at a location he selected on short notice, when there
was no order requiring Ms. Marshall to personally receive the child.
conduct

following

the

entry of the

His

Protective Order constituted a

violation of the order.
Mr. Card's pattern of self-justified behavior is designed to harass
and adversely affect the emotional stability of the petitioner.

He has

done so in a manner to walk as close to the line, as he sees it, between
compliance with, and committing a violation of, the Protective Order so
that he feels he has not technically crossed it.
however, that he has.

The Court finds,

Notwithstanding that Mr. Card has completed his

domestic violence counseling and paid a fine, he has not internalized the
principles of the course.

Mr. Card, in his own myopic world, even hired
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a process server to serve Ms. Marshall with child support checks, after
being notified that Ms. Marshall had opened a file with the Office of
Recovery Services and appointed them as her agent for the collection of
child support.

The Court finds that this course of conduct was again

undertaken with the intent to harass and intimidate Ms. Marshall.
The Court had hoped to see a change in Mr. Card's behavior, but

there has been none.

He continues to take actions that make sure things

are done the way he, and only he, thinks they ought to be done.

The

reality is that his behavior is calculated to intimidate, harass and
ensure the emotional distress of the petitioner.

Mr. Card is unable to

admit his actions are detrimental to the petitioner or that they are
anything but reasonable.
would

find

Mr.

Card's

A

reasonable person in these circumstances

actions

to be

threatening,

troubling,

and

disconcerting, and they would cause fear of future abuse and domestic
violence.
The Court finds that Ms. Marshall has been harassed, intimidated and
has a reasonable fear of continued abuse, and that the Protective Order
should remain in ef feet.

Accordingly, Mr.

Card's objection to the

Commissioner's recommendation is overruled.
Pursuant to Section 78B-7-115(3), Utah Code Ann., the Court enters
the following sanctions against Mr. Card based upon the Court's finding
that Mr.

Card has

petitioner.

acted with intent to harass

or

intimidate the

He is prohibited from further direct contact with Ms.
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He is prohibited from depositing money into her bank account,

or from taking any action to determine where she lives.
from being within 1,000 feet of her residence.

He is prohibited

He is to use exclusively

the third-party professional agency for parent time exchanges.
Mr. Card is to pay Ms. Marshall's counsel's reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in these proceedings.

Dated this

/ ~ day of November,
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IN 'l'BE DISTRICT COUR~ OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LARE COUNTY, STATE OF U'l'AH

MINUTE EN'!RY

ARIA REBEKAH CARD,
nka Aria Marshall,

CASE NO.

124901827

Petitioner,

vs.
Judge Paul G. Maughan

DEVIN JOHN CARD,
Respondent.

Before the Court is the petitioner's proposed Order following an
evidentiary hearing on September 1, 2015 regarding the respondent's
Objection to the Commissioner's Order extending the length of an existing
Protective Order.

Also before the Court are the respondent's Objections

to the form of the Order, and Motion to Strike Premature Request to

Submit.
The Court has reviewed both the Order and the Objection and the
transcript of the hearing, which includes the court's oral findings
announced at the conclusion of the hearing. The Court has entered as of
this date an Order which modifies the Order submitted by the petitioner,
and addresses the concerns of the respondent.

In doing so, the Court has

also clarified and modified some of its oral findings and as set forth
in the Order signed this date.

The Order entered accompanying this

Minute Entry does stand as the Order of the Court, and the oral findings

00399

Cferk

CARO V. CARD

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

of the Court announced on September 1, 2015 are modified as indicated in
the Order.

The respondent's Motion to Strike is now moot and his request

for attorney's fees is denied.
Dated t h i s $ day of November,

00400
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/' ·:·:;1~·r~.: ~"\
Dated: November 13, 2015
Isl PAU[;b~~

01:15:03 PM

::~,j~/

Districf-fi_....
- :...!t.~!;],~Yt,·1

JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES H. WOODALL, PLLC
Attorney for petitioner
10808 River Front Parkway, Suite I 75
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Telephone: (801) 254-9450
email: jw@utahtrustee.com
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

ARIA REBEKAH CARD,
now known as Rebecca Marshall,
1
Petitioner,
vs.

JUDGMENT
Case No. 12-4901827 PO
C\

Judge Paul G. Maughan
Commissioner Kim M. Luhn

l

"iii;/

DEVIN JOHN CARD,
Respondent.
The Court, having determined that an award of attorney's fees and costs is

appropriate, and having considered counsel's Affidavit of Fees,judgment shall enter against
respondent and in favor of petitioner for $2,283.75, with interest accruing thereon at 2.27% from
<

and after the date of ~try.

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ 2015.

BY THE COURT:

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSMITTAL
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Address (may be omitted~ privacy)
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1ty, S te, IP
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1{/./~3

Telephone (may be omitted)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Id r.~ ~

CeJ.

)
)
)

Petitioner,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

Dev1"

r~f"",
Respondent.

PROTECTIVE ORDER
Civil No. )

'J.. - l.J ?O l

<i(

J =f- .

,-.Judge

I f,(J a~e

Commissioner

A' e If
JI

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT: YOU CAN BE ARRESTED FOR "VIOLATING TIIlS
ORDER EVEN IF ANY PERSON PROTECTED BY THE ORDER INVITES OR
ALLOWS YOU TO VIOLATE THE ORDER'S PROHIBITIONS. ONLY THE COURT
CAN C~GE THE ORDER. YOU MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING
OR ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER.
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: YOU CANNOT WAIVE, ALTER, IGNORE OR
DISMISS THIS ORDER WITHOUT FURTHER COURT ACTION. YOU MAY BE

HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING OR ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE
ORDER.
This matter came for hearing on
following parties were in attendance:

~

D

Petitioner
Respondent

~
D

A,,;/ /4 20/,>,
J

before the undersigned. The
.

bn

Petitioner's attorney
{1J. /f1.,,,_ ir ,ort.y
Respondent's attorney _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(_
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. The Court having reviewed Petitioner•s Verified Petition for Protective Order and:
_

having received argument and evidence,

_

having accepted the stipulation of the parties,

_ having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear, and it appearing
that domestic violence or abuse has occurred and/or there is a substantial likelihood of immediate
danger of abuse or domestic violence to the Petitioner by the Respondent

PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE SECTION 30-6-4.2 THE PETITIONER IS GRANTED A
PROTECTIVE ORDER:
(The Judge or Commissioner shall. initial
each section that is included in this Order.)

THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING ORD~RS IN THIS CRIMINAL PORTION OF THE
PROTECTIVE ORDER. Two years after the date of this order, the Respondent may request a
hearing to dismiss the criminal portion of this order. The Petitioner is entitled to receive notice
from the Court. Therefore, within 30 days prior to the end of the two year period, the Petitioner
must provide the Court with a current address, which address will not be made available to the
Respondent, if the Petitioner wants to receive notice.
JI,.

1

"Tu.A_

1.
Upon the court finding that the Respondent presents a credible threat to the safety
of the Petitioner and/or the designated minor children and family and household members,
the Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse·
or domestic violence against Petitioner and shall not stalk, harass, or threaten or use or
attempt to use physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury
to the Petitioner.
2.

The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to

commit abuse or domestic violence against the designated minor children and family
and household members and shall not stalk, harass. or threaten or use or attempt to use
physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury to those
parties. The designated minor children and members of Petitioner, s family or

-~~---~a.
household are:

(Do "G: 2/J.Ola )
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~
-It"

- - 3.
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing,
telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.

1Ji.A__

4.
The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay awa~~om
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: /'1 / ~ 1
~J
t)\
and any subsequent residence of
pet)U
known to the Respondent, and Respondent is prohibited from te;rminating or
interfering with the utility services to the residence .

ner

f"":Jk J1tik

lei'...~,

.\( ~ 5.

The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment,
and/or other places, and their premises. frequented by the Petitioner, the minor children
and the designated household and family members. This includes any subsequent
school, place of employment or other places known to the Respondent, which are
frequented by the. Petitioner or by the designated family and household members. The
current addresses include:

6.
Under state law pursuant to this order, the Court having found that Respondent's
use or possession of a weapon may pose a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the
Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm and/or the
follbwing weapon(s):

~

1}JA_ 7.

The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile
and/or other essential personal eff1;_cts:
~
I
>"- o) !U
'et--- t! 'f::_

,4/

i riope,rt:j

f¢ze ,;;,;,,

!'

and all personal property belonging to Petitioner and/or the minor child/ren.

This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future civil
proceedings.
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8.
An officer from the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely rega_ins_p_o-ss_es_s-io_n_of_th_e__
awarded property.
9.
An officer from the following law enforcement agency :_ _ _ _ _ _ _shall
facilitate Respondent's removal of Respondent s essential personal belongings from the
parties' residence. The Jaw enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these
arrangements. Respondent may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to
obtain any items.
1

10.
The Respondent is placed ·under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the
execution of this Order, the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic
monitoring device on Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the
premises of Petitioner and in the residence of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to
pay to the Department of Corrections the costs of the electronic monitoring required by
this Order. The Department of Corrections shall have access to Petitioner• s residence
to install the appropriate monitoring equipment.

RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS 11 1" THROUGH "7" OF THIS
ORDER IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR UNDER UTAH CODE SECTIONS 30-6-4.2(5)
and 76-5-108.

IF RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH 11 711 OF Tms
ORDER IS A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSE,
ENHANCED PENALTIES MAY BE IMPOSED UNDER UTAH CODE SECTIONS 7736-1.1 AND 77-36-2.4.
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief in the Civil Portion of this Protective Order
(provisions a through 1 which will (expire/be reviewed by the court) ___ days from
the date of this order:
11

11

11

11

)

xlNA-

3·

When a minor child is included in a protective order, the Petitioner may provide a copy
of the order to the Principal of the school where the child attends.
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.J

If the Respondent fails to return custody of a minor child as ordered in this order the
Petitioner may obtain a writ of assistance from the Court.
Visitation shall be as follows:

'2,/J

..r' .:DIA_

UH

;.L,~ ,

CuA

k'?,'c& p/21

ol--

c.
The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during
visitation.

/}I, 1)JA d.

The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ten from
the state of Utah.

e.
The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount
of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
f.
The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-l 1, Parts 4 and 5. ·

The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care
. _ _ g.
expenses.
The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments.

h.

i.

The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of

$_ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ j.
The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a
result of the abuse in the amount of $

----------
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k.
The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren's medical expenses.
suffered as a result of the abuse in the amount of $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
I.

Other:

-----------------------

Notice to Petitioner: If, ~t any time. you receive services through the Office of Recovery
Services (ORS) and you want to keep your location information confidential, you must provide
a copy of your current protective order to ORS.

VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "a 11 THROUGH "1" MAY SUBJECT RESPONDENT TO
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
11.
The Di vision of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an
investigation into the allegation of child abuse.
12.

A Guardian ad Litem is appointed to represent the best interests of the children.

13.

Other:

14. Under federal law, the Respondent may be prohibited from purchasing, owning,
transporting, using or possessing a firearm or ammW1ition. A violation of this prohibition may
be a separate federal crime. There is an exemption for police and military personnel while on
actual duty and those individuals should contact their immediate supervisors for further
instructions.
Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall
have authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to
15.

forcibly evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. •Information to assist with
identification of the Respondent is attached to this Order.
16.
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the
hearing that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
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8/03

00043

P.L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States,
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories.

17.
Two years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the two-year period, the
Petitioner should provide the court wi~ a current address, which address wilt not be made
available to Respondent.

DATED:

\'b

~ GO~'L.
BY THE COURT:

~

DISTRJCT COURT JU
Recommended by:

By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, of this Protective Order
and waives the right to be personally served.

Respondent
Serve Respondent at:

Street:
City/Town:
State/Zip:
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